

Effects of Settlement into Ethnic Enclaves on Immigrant Voter Turnout*

HENRIK ANDERSSON[†], NAZITA LAJEVARDI[‡], KARL-OSKAR LINDGREN[§]

AND SVEN OSKARSSON[¶]

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[†]Department of Government at Uppsala University

[‡]Department of Political Science at Michigan State University.

[§]Department of Government at Uppsala University

[¶]Department of Government at Uppsala University.

Abstract

What is the effect of residing in ethnic enclaves on immigrants' future political participation? We study a comprehensive refugee placement reform that was implemented in Sweden in the mid-1980s in combination with unique individual-level turnout data to study the causal effect of being settled in neighborhoods with a high residential concentration of coethnics on immigrants' future probability of voting. We find little evidence that ethnic concentration *per se* affects voter turnout. On average, newly arrived immigrants were equally likely to vote whether they were placed in a neighborhood with many or few coethnics. Further analyses, however, indicate that the effect of ethnic concentration depends on the degree of political integration among previously settled coethnics; ethnic concentration increases turnout among the newly immigrated when they are placed with already politically integrated coethnics. These results underscore the conditions under which the political socialization of immigrant newcomers is enhanced in ethnic enclaves.

Keywords: Immigrants, Political Participation, Ethnic Enclaves, Voter Turnout

What is the effect of settling in a neighborhood with coethnics—or ethnic enclaves—on immigrants’ future political participation? Historically, residential segregation, social isolation, and minority exclusion have been correlated with the autonomous development of ethnic political structures (Borjas, 1992; Wolfinger, 1965). Moreover, extant scholarship finds ethnic political structures to be consequential for politics, though studies disagree on whether settlement into ethnic enclaves increases or decreases political engagement. Among studies that find ethnic enclaves to increase political participation (e.g. Bhatti and Hansen, 2016; Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2008), these communities are credited for increasing group consciousness and perceptions of discrimination (Barreto and Pedraza, 2009; Wolfinger, 1965; Wong et al., 2005), which together politically mobilize minority voters (Oskooii, 2016).¹ Others, meanwhile, have arrived at the opposite conclusion; residence in ethnic enclaves has mixed or negative effects on political participation (e.g. Cho et al., 2006; Trounstine, 2018), because these neighborhoods distance minorities from the political process. A drawback of these studies, however, is that they cannot address the possibility that immigrants self-sort into areas with high coethnic densities.²

Moving beyond correlational work, studies in economics have used various natural experiments, such as refugee placement policies, to assess the causal impact of settlement into an ethnic enclave on a number of outcomes, finding that there is both an upside and a downside to residing in one. Some have found positive effects on income (e.g. Beaman, 2011; Damm, 2009; Edin et al., 2004) and welfare reciprocity (e.g. Bertrand et al., 2000), negative effects on unemployment and schooling (e.g. Cutler and Glaeser, 1997), and mixed effects on self-employment (e.g. Andersson, 2020; Damm, 2009). Studies have yet to extend this line of inquiry to assess the causal impact of *where immigrants settle* on their future political participation. From the state’s perspective, refugee dispersal policies typically respond to a belief that immigrant residential segregation hampers their integration (Damm, 2009). Nonetheless, it is unknown whether immigrants in enclaves politically participate less than their counterparts.

In this research note, we examine if residing in an ethnic enclave impacts immigrant electoral participation, by estimating the causal effect of being placed in neighborhoods with high

¹For instance, Latinos first entered American politics en masse through naturalization and turnout in the 1990s in response to immigration reform (Pantoja et al., 2001).

²That is, immigrants who choose to settle in such areas may be different from those settling outside them.

residential concentration of coethnics on immigrants' future probability of voting. Our outcome is measured using validated individual-level turnout data on validated turnout, taken from Swedish election registers. This data allows us to not only track these demographics convincingly, but also to rule out ecological inference concerns that may stem from not knowing whether the observed increases in turnout are attributable to immigrants or non-immigrants. To bypass sorting and issues of endogeneity, we evaluate a Swedish refugee placement policy, which generated exogenous variation in neighborhood composition. We explore two facets of the ethnic enclave: (1) the number of local resident coethnics in the enclave and (2) the level of integration—measured as voting levels among local coethnics—in the enclave.³

Ethnic enclaves arguably allow for “bonding” to take place among coethnic locals and newcomers, in turn mobilizing solidarity. Dense coethnic networks are more likely to yield strong rather than weak ties, which are initially important for tying together smaller communities, breeding local cohesion, and allowing for bonding (Granovetter, 1973). As such, these enclaves provide the requisite social, psychological, and economic support for less fortunate members of the community, such as by providing start-up financing, markets, and reliable labor for local entrepreneurs (Putnam, 2000). Nonetheless, ethnic enclaves—through their strong social ties—also may be at greater risk of producing negative externalities, such as by leading to distancing from the broader society (Granovetter, 1973) or by attracting strong outgroup antagonism or by breeding prejudice in the form of bias and racism, sexism, or ageism (Putnam, 2000). Thus, settling in ethnic enclaves with more local coethnics may affect immigrants' future turnout, because they allow for immigrants and their coethnics to deepen contact with people of similar beliefs or interests, which may both increase or decrease their participation.

However, the size of the enclave and the political and social resources of local coethnics may also matter for political participation.⁴ Given that decisions to participate in politics are not formed in a vacuum (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944), and are largely dependent on individuals' social networks (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995; Kenny, 1992; Mutz, 2002), those immigrant newcomers who settle in enclaves where local coethnics participate more in politics have the

³Our measure of integration captures incorporation into the broader society, rather than integration into immigrant's own coethnic group locally.

⁴For example, these resources can provide coethnics with knowledge, skills, contacts, and capital, all of which matter for incorporation into the polity (Andersson, 2020).

potential to acquire a great deal of social and political capital, which can foster higher turnout among the newly settled (Bratsberg et al., 2019). Ultimately, it is an open empirical question whether ethnic networks have different effects for immigrant voting depending on the nature of these networks.

Institutional setting, data and empirical framework

Sweden's history of migration resembles those experiences of other European countries. Above all, the inflow of immigrants in the decades following the Second World War was dominated by labor migrants. This pattern changed in the early 1970's following a massive increase in refugee and family unification immigration from Chile, Iran, Poland, the Balkans and, lately, from Syria, Somalia, and Afghanistan. Today, about one fifth of Sweden's population was born abroad. As in most Western countries, immigrants are largely concentrated in certain regions and neighborhoods, especially in larger cities.

In response to the mounting load on cities most affected by the rise in immigration, regulations on immigrant placement underwent a reform in the mid 1980s (Edin et al., 2003). The main goal of this policy was to speed up the integration process by depriving the refugees the right to settle according to their own preferences; instead, the Swedish Immigration Board assigned all newly-arrived asylum seekers to an initial municipality of residence. Non-refugee immigrants were not affected by this reform.

Scholars have previously used the placement reform to estimate the causal effects of ethnic concentration on various economic and social outcomes. In the first study to employ the reform Edin et al. (2003) showed that living in ethnic enclaves improves labor earnings for immigrants and that this effect is stronger the higher the incomes among the coethnics. Later studies found that the resources among the coethnics are more important than the ethnic concentration per se. For instance, Åslund and Fredriksson (2009) reported that welfare dependence increase if the immigrants are placed in a welfare dependent community. Likewise, Åslund et al. (2011) showed that school performance is positively related to the number of highly educated adults in the community sharing the immigrants's ethnicity.

In this study, we turn to the placement reform to test if ethnic concentration influences immigrants' propensity to vote in local elections. As the effect of ethnic concentration on turnout is

theoretically ambiguous and previous empirical research has shown that ethnic concentration can have both positive and negative effects on economic and social outcomes we have no clear expectations about the nature of the relationship.

To study the effect of residential ethnic concentration on turnout, we use data on validated turnout from three Swedish elections: the local elections in 1994 and 2010 and the 2009 European Parliament election.⁵ Non-Swedish citizens are eligible to vote in the local elections after being a resident for at least three years. We focus the analysis on refugees that immigrated to Sweden between 1987 and 1991 and who were eligible to vote in the election in 1994.⁶ Moreover, since the placement policy did not apply to tied-movers, we exclude all immigrants with a sibling or an adult household member who already resided (a prior year) in the country. After imposing these restrictions, the final sample consists of 63,370 immigrants.

We merge this data with various administrative registers using unique personal identifiers. The linked datasets contain detailed information on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Importantly, the registers contain country of birth and place of residence, which we use to infer information on the local ethnic concentration. Specifically, we follow [Åslund and Fredriksson \(2009\)](#), and use *parishes* to construct our neighborhoods. A “parish” is an administrative unit separating Sweden into approximately 2,500 neighborhoods with an average population of 4000 individuals. More information on the benefits of using parishes, as well as descriptive statistics for our estimation sample is found in Tables [A1](#) and [A2](#) in the Appendix.

The dominant approach in previous studies on this question has been to relate the degree of political participation of immigrants to the number of coethnics living in their neighborhood ([Bhatti and Hansen, 2016](#); [Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2008](#)).⁷ Nonetheless, interpreting such correlations as evidence of a causal impact of ethnic concentration is problematic due to the fact that immigrants self-sort into different neighborhoods. Consequently, if there are some unmea-

⁵Electronic voting records are not used in Sweden. Turnout data have instead been gathered by scanning and digitizing the complete election rolls for the 1994, 2009 and 2010 elections. See [Lindgren et al. \(2019\)](#) for a discussion on the high quality and reliability of these voter files.

⁶The placement policy was formally in effect between 1985 and 1994, but the implementation was strictest between 1987 and 1991 ([Edin et al., 2003](#)). Since refugee status cannot be directly observed in the administrative data, we follow the approach of [Åslund and Fredriksson \(2009\)](#) and define refugees as immigrants from countries outside of Western Europe that were not members of the OECD as of 1985. The only exception to this rule is that we also include immigrants from Turkey in the sample.

⁷These studies have each found that the impact of geographic concentration of coethnic voters increases individuals’ likelihood of turnout in elections across different electoral contexts.

sured factors that affect both an immigrant’s decision to settle in a location with high ethnic concentration and his or her probability of voting, we may mistakenly attribute the impact of these factors to ethnic concentration. An important advantage of the present study is that we can mitigate this problem by leveraging the Swedish refugee placement reform, which lessens the risk that the relationship between ethnic concentration and turnout was affected by omitted variable bias by reducing the opportunity for refugees to choose their own location.

More concretely, we estimate the effect of coethnic concentration in the immigrants arrival parish on voter turnout using a regression model of the following type:

$$y_{igpk} = \alpha + \beta_1 E_{kgp} + \Gamma' \mathbf{X}_i + \mu_{gk} + \gamma_p + \varepsilon_{igpk}, \quad (1)$$

where y_{igpk} denotes turnout for individual i , belonging to ethnic group g and placed by the Swedish authorities in parish p upon arrival with cohort k in Sweden; E_{kgp} denotes the share of coethnics (E) relative to the total number of individuals in one’s parish of arrival; \mathbf{X} is a vector of individual-level control variables⁸; μ_{gk} and γ_p represent fixed effects for country by birth cohort and parish of arrival, respectively; and ε_{igpk} is an individual level error term. The country of birth variable, E_{kgp} , has been grouped into 27 distinct groups (out of which 15 groups represent separate refugee sending countries) for confidentiality. For immigrants from significant sending countries (e.g., Iran, Iraq, and Turkey) the region code is that of the country, but for those from other countries the code also includes neighboring countries.⁹

We use this empirical framework and identify the effect of being placed with a larger share of coethnics on voter turnout by comparing individuals from a particular country (group) who arrived to Sweden in the same year, but who were placed in parishes with unequally large shares of residents from that country. The identifying assumption underlying this framework is that the initial placement of the immigrants in specific parishes is conditionally exogenous. More precisely, we assume that the Immigrant Board Offices made their decisions solely based on characteristics that we observe and can control for, such as age, sex, education, and family

⁸In the regression models we control for sex, age (entered linearly and squared), number of children, and dummy indicators for being married, being a parent and having some post-secondary education. All control variables are measured at the year of arrival (1987–1991).

⁹Table A3 provides the frequency of source countries (groups) and Table A4 provides the full classification of country groups.

situation. Previous studies using the placement reform substantiate this claim by demonstrating that i) the policy was comprehensive, ii) immigrant preferences did not play any decisive role in the process of assigning settlement parish, and iii) there was no interaction between local Immigration Board officers and individual refugees in the placement process (Edin et al., 2003).

As Nekby and Pettersson-Lidbom (2017) highlight, it is difficult to assess the plausibility of these assumptions in the absence of individual level data on placement decisions.¹⁰ While we cannot guarantee that our research design mitigates all endogeneity concerns, the introduction of the placement program made immigrant settlement more exogenous by restricting immigrants opportunities to choose their initial location. The strongest evidence for this is that the placement program had a clear impact on the geographical distribution of immigrants' settlement patterns. Figure 1 displays the share of newly arrived refugees (solid line) and non-refugees (dashed line) out of the total number of newly arrived refugees and non-refugees who settled in the ten municipalities with the highest proportion of inhabitants from refugee sending countries in 1984 (the year before the settlement program was introduced). The dotted vertical lines demarcate the start (1985) and end (1994) years of the reform period. It is clear that the reform induced a major change in settlement patterns. There is a sharp decrease in the inflow of refugee immigrants into these ten municipalities during the reform years, whereas no similar pattern emerges in the non-refugee group that was not affected by the reform.¹¹


Results

Table 1 applies Equation 1 and displays the main results. We divide the table into two panels; the upper panel shows the short run effects (1994 election) and the latter shows the long run effects (2010 election). Beginning with the upper panel, the coefficient in column 1 shows the effect of 1 standard deviation increase in the share of coethnics on participation in the 1994 local election, conditional on parish and country by cohort fixed effects, as well as the set of individual covariates (see Table 1 for details). The coefficient is positive, but small in magnitude and not statistically significant. On average, we thus see no clear evidence of a mobilization

¹⁰Nekby and Pettersson-Lidbom (2017) also list a number of other difficulties associated with the use of the placement program design. However, these problems primarily concern the measurement of the aggregate inflow of refugees at the municipality level, and are therefore of less relevance for the present study.

¹¹Table A5 further substantiates the conditional exogeneity of the dispersion policy; immigrants with a higher (ex-ante) predicted vote tendency were settled in parishes with neither significantly more nor fewer coethnics.

Figure 1: Share of refugees and non-refugees settling in the 10 largest municipalities, 1975-2005.



Source: Data from Statistics Sweden.

effect on newcomers from living in neighborhoods with higher concentrations of coethnics.

While we see no clear average effect, resources among local coethnics may matter for immigrant political participation. We are specifically interested in *political* integration, and in columns 2-5, we consider how the effect of ethnic concentration varies over the distribution of political integration among the coethnics. For this specification, we make use of participation in a previous election: 1982. More exactly, we use the share of all resident coethnics in 1987–1991 who voted in the elections in 1982.¹² Using this measure of political integration—as measured by voting—within the local enclave, we split the sample into quartiles: from the least politically integrated enclaves (Q1) to the most integrated (Q4), and redo the baseline estimation for each quartile.

The average estimate hides considerable heterogeneity. In the first three quartiles (columns 2-4), the estimated coefficients are insignificant and even negative, suggesting a small effect of coethnics when political integration is low. Most strikingly, however, is the strong positive effect seen only in the fourth quartile. The point estimate in column 5 suggests that one standard deviation increase in the share of coethnics increases voting by around 2.2 percentage points, which represents around 4–5 percent of overall turnout in this group. The implication of the

¹² $\frac{Vote_{gpt}^{1982}}{E_{gpt}}$, where $Vote_{gpt}^{1982}$ is the number of 1982 voters within ethnic group g , living in parish p in arrival year t and E_{gpt} represents all coethnics within the same ethnic group, parish and arrival year.

Table 1: Effect of coethnics in arrival parish 1987-1991 on voting in the 1994 and 2010 elections.

	Full sample (1)	Quartiles (based on pol. integrated coethnics)			
		Q1 (2)	Q2 (3)	Q3 (4)	Q4 (5)
PANEL A (Short run, 1994 elections)					
Coethnics/ parish inhabitants	0.00766 (0.00689)	0.0108 (0.0116)	-0.0202 (0.0118)	-0.00281 (0.0135)	0.0218*** (0.00519)
Observations	61152	15334	15257	15260	15300
PANEL B (Long run, 2010 elections)					
Coethnics/ parish inhabitants	-0.00210 (0.00359)	0.00837 (0.0106)	0.0118 (0.0146)	0.00560 (0.0123)	-0.00166 (0.00468)
Observations	49991	13217	12829	12386	11559
Country by cohort FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Parish FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Individual covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Standard errors clustered on municipality level. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Individual controls include age, age², number of children and dummies for sex, married or not, parenthood and highly educated or not.

result in column 5 is that being placed with more coethnics can indeed increase political participation, but the effect may hinge on the level of political integration among the coethnics.¹³

Having shown a *short run* positive impact of ethnic concentration conditional on a certain level of political integration among coethnics, we now consider any *long run* effects. We use additional information on individual voter turnout in the 2010 national election. These results employ the same research design as for the short run, and can be found in Table 1, panel B.

Turning to the results in columns 1-5 we find no evidence of an effect in the long run, neither from the share of coethnics on average, nor from the share of coethnics over different levels of political integration. One likely explanation for this is that immigrants placed together with many politically active coethnics begin voting sooner on arrival than those who are not placed

¹³Political integration may be correlated with a number of other resources, such as the level of income or education within the enclave, and we cannot be completely certain exactly which resource that causes increases in voting. That said, in the Appendix, we provide suggestive evidence that it is indeed the political level of integration (as opposed to socioeconomic resources) which seems to be driving the observed results (see Table A11). We also present a number of alternative specifications and robustness checks in the Appendix which test the importance of arriving in an already integrated enclave rather than merely arriving in an enclave with many coethnics per se. Above all, we use a different definition of political integration using $\frac{Vote_{gpt}^{1982}}{Right_{gpt}^{1982}}$, where $Vote_{gpt}^{1982}$ just as previously is the number of 1982 voters within ethnic group g , living in parish p in arrival year t and $Right_{gpt}^{1982}$ represents all coethnics within the same ethnic group, parish, and arrival year who had the right to vote in 1982. Our results are robust to this change in the split sample estimation (see Table A7). We also show that the results are robust to using a different functional form of the explanatory variable (logs), to focusing on the subset of ethnic groups, for which we know the exact birth country (Table A8) and to adding a control for if an immigrant moved between municipalities within the first year in Sweden (Table A6). Moreover, the results look very similar if we split the sample by gender (Table A12) or by the strength of the populist right (Table A13).

in such contexts, but that the latter group closes this gap as time passes. These non-significant long run results are also replicated when we employ turnout in the 2009 EU-election, where we can also observe individual level data. The results from these estimations are found in Table A9, again indicating no long term effect.¹⁴

Discussion

This study examines how ethnic concentration affects immigrant political integration, here measured as voter turnout. Compared to previous research on this issue, the present study benefits from access to richer data and from a more credible identification strategy. By exploiting the refugee placement policy that was put in place in Sweden in the mid-1980s, we considerably reduce the risk that the results are explained by immigrants self-sorting into different types of neighborhoods and by the voting data.

Three important conclusions emerge from our analyses. First, we find little evidence that ethnic concentration *per se* affects voter turnout. On average, newly arrived immigrants were equally likely to vote whether they were placed in a neighborhood with many or fewer coethnics. However, a second finding of the paper is that this average effect may actually conceal as much as it reveals, since the ethnic concentration effect depends on the degree of political integration among previously settled coethnics. Ethnic concentration tends to increase turnout among newly arrived immigrants when their previously settled coethnics are politically integrated. Third, the results show that this effect disappears in the long-term. This last finding indicates that ethnic concentration may mainly affect the speed of political integration by inducing newly arrived immigrants to begin to vote sooner on arrival, whereas voter turnout in the longer run is not impacted by ethnic concentration.

In sum, our findings suggest that scholars should pay closer attention to contextual circumstances when studying the effect of ethnic concentration on political integration. In doing so, researchers should assess whether our results apply also to non-refugee immigrants, e.g., economic migrants, or if the effect of ethnic networks differs across different types of immigrants.

The findings are also of policy relevance since they indicate that ethnic concentration or segregation in itself is of little consequence to (refugee) immigrants' future voter turnout. Instead,

¹⁴Importantly, the difference between long run and short run effects is not (mainly) due to differences in samples. We demonstrate this in Table A10 by re-estimating the short run results only using the long-run sample.

the results suggest that ethnic networks can either foster or impede political integration depending on the nature of these networks. Perhaps, it is, thus, not the degree of ethnic concentration, but the amount of social and political capital embedded within existing ethnic networks that shapes newcomers' prospects for democratic inclusion.

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Henrik Andersson is a researcher at the Institute for Housing and Urban Research, Uppsala University, Sweden.

Nazita Lajevardi is an assistant professor at the Department of Political Science, Michigan State University, USA.

Karl-Oskar Lindgren is an associate professor at the Department of Government, Uppsala University, Sweden

Sven Oskarsson is a professor at the Department of Government, Uppsala University, Sweden

Supplementary Information to “Effects of Settlement into Ethnic Enclaves on Immigrant Voter Turnout”

Details on Data and Measures

This section provides a description of the data sources and variables used for the paper “Effects of Settlement into Ethnic Enclaves on Immigrant Voter Turnout.”

Data Availability

We use individual level data from Swedish registers. The data material is located on an encrypted server to which we have to log in through a remote desktop application in order to perform all of our data analyses. Due to the sensitivity of the data, we are under contractual and ethical obligation not to distribute these data to others.

For those researchers who want to replicate our results there are two ways to get access to the administrative data. The first way is to order the data directly from Statistics Sweden (SCB). Statistics Sweden presently requires that researchers obtain permission from the Swedish Ethical Review Board before data can be ordered (a description of how to order data from Statistics Sweden is available at: <https://www.scb.se/en/services/guidance-for-researchers-and-universities/>). We will also make available a complete list all of the variables that we ordered from Statistics Sweden for this project, together with the statistical code used for the analyses.

The second way to replicate our analyses is to come to Sweden and reanalyze these data through the same remote server system that we used. Researchers interested in using this option should reach out to us prior to coming to Sweden so that we can apply for approval from the Ethical Review Board for the researcher to temporarily be added to our research team, which is mandatory in order to get access to the remote server system.

Variables and Data Sources

Turnout General 1982 — Equal to 1 if the individual voted in the Swedish general election in 1982. The information is retrieved from scanned election rolls, and was collected by Magnus Carlsson and Dan-Olof Roth.

Turnout General 1994 — Equal to 1 if the individual voted in the Swedish general election in 1994.

The information is retrieved from scanned election rolls.

Turnout General 2010 — Equal to 1 if the individual voted in the Swedish general election in 2010.

The information is retrieved from scanned election rolls.

Turnout EP 2009 — Equal to 1 if the individual voted in the Swedish European Parliament election in 2009. The information is retrieved from scanned election rolls.

Female — Equal to 1 if female. Information is retrieved from the Swedish Population Register.

Birth Year — Information is retrieved from the Swedish Population Register.

Immigration Year — Information is retrieved from the Swedish Population Register.

Married — Equal to 1 if married at the time of arrival in Sweden. Information is retrieved from the Longitudinal integration database for health insurance and labour market studies (LISA by Swedish acronym).

Children — Number of children at the time of arrival in Sweden. Information is retrieved from the Longitudinal integration database for health insurance and labour market studies (LISA by Swedish acronym).

Assigned parish — Code for the parish in which the refugee was registered December 31, the year he/she received residence permit. Information is retrieved from the Swedish Population Register.

Ethnic concentration — The share (in percentage points) of the total population in the assigned parish belonging to the same country group of origin (see below) as the refugee at the time of arrival. Information is retrieved from the Swedish Population Register.

Education — Educational attainment at the time of arrival in Sweden according to the three-digit Swedish standard classification of education (SUN 2000). Highly educated is defined as having some post-secondary school education. The information on educational attainment is retrieved from the Longitudinal integration database for health insurance and labour market studies (LISA by Swedish acronym).

Income — Total yearly income (*SamRakInk*) from the 1985 and 1990 Censuses.

Occupational status — The measure is based on the occupational codes from the Censuses in 1985 and 1990. The occupational codes were then converted into status scores using the Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale (SIOPS) developed by Donald Treiman. The SIOPS scale is constructed by averaging the prestige scores of about 60 national prestige scales and then mapping the resulting scores

into ISCO-68 occupational titles.

Summary Statistics

Table A1 reports summary statistics for a number of variables in our estimation sample. As can be seen from the upper entries around half of the individuals in the sample took advantage of their right to vote in the 1994 local elections. This share had risen to above 70% in the 2010 local election.

With regards to our approximation of local ethnic concentration, we make use of parishes, which is a small administrative unit, separating Sweden's 10,000,000 inhabitants in about 2,500 units, which in turn are sorted into 290 municipalities. One argument for using parishes is that it has been used in similar prior studies, investigating the effects of ethnic enclaves among immigrants in Sweden on other outcomes, such as welfare dependence and self-employment (Andersson, 2020; Åslund and Fredriksson, 2009). A more theoretical argument is that the relatively small size of the units increases the likelihood of residents actually interacting with each other. While we think the choice of parishes is well-founded, another geographic unit frequently used is municipalities. With regards to the latter, the correlation between ethnic concentration in immigrants' municipality is highly correlated with the ethnic concentration in the parish. We therefore don't expect the choice of parishes over municipalities to have any big impact on the results.

Taking the average across all years, parishes and country groups, there are 173 coethnics in one's parish. This amounts to about 1% of the parish population. Our measure of political integration shows that on average 8% of one's parish coethnics voted in the 1982 local elections. Furthermore, columns 2-4 suggest that there is a fair amount of variation in both the share of resident coethnics and the degree of political integration across parishes.

Finally, from the descriptive statistics we can also conclude that the individuals in our sample were somewhat more likely to be males than females and on average arrived in Sweden at the age of 32.

Table A2 displays mean values and standard deviations for the same set of variables divided by two groups: individuals placed in small and large ethnic enclaves. Small enclaves refer to parishes in which coethnic density is below the median value, whereas large enclaves refer to parishes in which this value is above the median. Two things should be noted in this table. First, there are very small differences between the two groups in terms of turnout propensities, both in the short and in the long run. Second, the immigrants placed in parishes with low coethnic density were not equal to those placed in larger enclaves. The individuals in the former group are more likely to be male, slightly younger and non-married

and have fewer children and slightly higher education. These patterns speak directly to the identifying assumption underlying our empirical analysis: that the initial placement of immigrants, during the period in which the placement policy was in place, can be considered as exogenous only conditional upon the covariates included in the model. Given that the Immigration Board case officers deciding on the placement of newly arrived immigrants did not get to meet with the immigrants being placed and only had access to the kind of demographic and socioeconomic information presented in Tables A1 and A2 (and that these are included as controls in the empirical models), we argue that the conditional exogeneity assumption is plausible.

Table A1: Summary stats of variables used in estimations

	mean (1)	sd (2)	min (3)	max (4)	count (5)
Outcome					
Voted in local election 1994	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00	63,370
Voted in local election 2010	0.71	0.45	0.00	1.00	52,019
Enclave information					
# Coethnics	172.67	319.91	0.00	2,657	63,370
Coethnics/parish pop	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.13	63,370
Share 1982 voters among all coethnics	0.08	0.12	0.00	1.00	62,950
Controls					
Men	0.58	0.49	0.00	1.00	63,370
Age	31.60	13.10	10.00	101.00	63,370
Married	0.53	0.50	0.00	1.00	63,370
Parent	0.42	0.49	0.00	1.00	61,152
# of children	0.92	1.35	0.00	11.00	61,152
Highly educated	0.23	0.42	0.00	1.00	61,152
Moved out of municipality arrival year	0.22	0.41	0.00	1.00	63,370

Notes: Summary statistics for relevant variables used in the estimations. Voted in local elections 1994 (2010) shows the share of of the sample who voted in the municipal elections in 1994 (2010). # of coethnics is based on the number of coethnics in the parish of arrival. The dummy indicator for being highly educated is based on the education registries, and is equal to one for anyone with some post-secondary school (gymnasium) education.

Table A2: Summary stats of outcome and control variables, for large and small enclaves

	Small Enclave (1)	Large Enclave (2)	Total (3)
Outcome			
Voted in local election 1994	0.513 (0.500)	0.516 (0.500)	0.515 (0.500)
Voted in local election 2010	0.719 (0.449)	0.701 (0.458)	0.710 (0.454)
Controls			
Men	0.602 (0.490)	0.556 (0.497)	0.579 (0.494)
Age	31.07 (11.59)	33.46 (13.93)	32.27 (12.87)
Married	0.519 (0.500)	0.577 (0.494)	0.548 (0.498)
Parent	0.398 (0.489)	0.437 (0.496)	0.417 (0.493)
# of children	0.885 (1.358)	0.962 (1.355)	0.924 (1.357)
Highly educated	0.239 (0.427)	0.220 (0.414)	0.230 (0.421)
Moved out of municipality arrival year	0.225 (0.418)	0.211 (0.408)	0.218 (0.413)

Notes: Summary statistics for relevant variables used in the estimations. Small enclaves refers to parishes in which coethnic density is below the median value, whereas large enclaves refer to parishes in which this value is above the median.

Table A3: Frequency of origin countries and regions 1987-1991

	1987 (1)	1988 (2)	1989 (3)	1990 (4)	1991 (5)
Bosnia	11	3	14	8	10
Yugoslavia	349	417	672	896	606
Central America	161	226	192	261	192
Chile	1510	1564	3345	797	235
South America	328	268	388	416	438
East Africa	808	1117	1388	1608	1751
Mena	1006	1370	3289	2762	1905
Other Africa	277	245	344	261	336
Iran	4664	4946	3963	2270	1504
Iraq	298	863	827	1240	1190
Turkey	601	529	785	612	502
East Asia	204	304	337	411	341
South East Asia	336	568	569	907	834
South Asia	341	244	455	460	491
Total	10894	12664	16568	12909	10335

Notes: Number of immigrants per country groups used in sample. See Table A4 for exact classification of country groups.

Table A4: Classification of country groups

Code	Country of origin
Bosnia	Bosnia-Herzegovina
Yugoslavia	Yugoslavia, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia
Poland	Poland
Central America	Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, St. Kitts-Nevis
Chile	Chile
South America	Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guayana, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Uruguay, Venezuela
East Africa	Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan
Mena	Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, French protectorate in Morocco, United Arab Emirates, Gaza Strip, Israel, Yemen, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Syria, Tunisia
Other Africa	Angola, United Arab Republic, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Kenya, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauretania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, South Africa, Tanzania, Chad, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, Zanzibar, Zimbabwe
Iran	Iran
Iraq	Iraq
Turkey	Turkey
East Asia	Hong Kong, Japan, China, Taiwan, North Korea, South Korea
South East Asia	Burma, Philippines, Indonesia, Laos, Federation of Malaya, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam
South Asia	Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, India, Democratic Kampuchea, Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Sikkim, Sri Lanka

Notes: Classification of countries into 15 groups of refugee sending countries.

Auxiliary Analyses

In this section we provide some brief comments on the auxiliary results, robustness checks and diagnosis tests we discuss in the main text.

A simple test for exogeneity

To substantiate the conditional exogenous nature of the policy, we provide a simple test, which follows the following logic:

First, we use pre-treatment characteristics in a linear regression to predict the individual probability of voting:

$$y_{igkp} = \alpha + \Gamma' \mathbf{X}_i + \mu_{gk} + \varepsilon_{igp}, \quad (\text{A1})$$

where, much as in the main text, y_{igkp} denotes turnout in the local election of 1994 for individual i . X_i is a vector of individual-level control variables — sex, age (entered linearly and squared), number of children, and dummy indicators for being married, being a parent and having some post-secondary education — and μ_{gk} represent fixed effects for country by birth cohort.

The results of Equation A1 is seen in the first column of Table A5. This is only the first step, and we do not wish to put a lot of emphasis on these results, but we can note that signs are as expected. For example, those with a higher education vote significantly more than those with lower education and older individuals vote more than younger.

Having estimated Equation A1, we now take out the linear prediction of y_{igkp} (\hat{y}_{igkp}), which serves as the ex-ante probability of voting, based on individual characteristics. We then use \hat{y}_{igkp} as an independent variable in a second regression:

$$E_{gkp} = \beta \hat{y}_{igkp} + \gamma_p + \varepsilon_{igkp}, \quad (\text{A2})$$

where, again, E_{gkp} is the parish share of coethnics and γ_p is the parish fixed effects.

To put it a bit more clearly: We predict the “ex-ante” probability of voting using individual characteristics in Equation A1. Now, in Equation A2, the predicted probability of voting (\hat{y}_{igkp}) should not be systematically related to the share of coethnics in the parishes (E_{gkp}), in other words we want β to be insignificant. If, for example, there is a significant positive relationship between the linear prediction and the share of coethnics at the parish, it means individuals with a higher ex-ante probability of voting also ended up in larger enclaves, which would imply that we are overestimating the effect of enclaves.

Yet, looking at Table A5 (Column 2), a standard deviation increase (we standardized \hat{y}_{igkp} to simplify the interpretation of the effect) in the predicted probability of voting (amounting to a 14 percentage point increase), has a small, imprecise, negative relation with the share of coethnics at the parish one is placed in: namely 0.007 percentage points smaller, which is 5 percent of a standard deviation of the share of coethnics. In quartile 4 (and also in quartile 2), we note a slightly significant result. However, the point estimates are negative, which would imply that, if anything, we are underestimating the effect of more coethnics in quartile 4.

Table A5: Diagnostics table - Linear prediction of voting, effect of linear prediction on share of coethnics in parish

	Eq. A1 (1)	Quartiles (based on pol. integrated coethnics)				
		Eq A2: Full sample (2)	Q1 (3)	Q2 (4)	Q3 (5)	Q4 (6)
Man	0.0209*** (0.00414)					
Married	0.0113* (0.00523)					
Age	0.0191*** (0.000797)					
Age ²	-0.000224*** (0.00000915)					
Parent	0.0560*** (0.00736)					
# of children	0.0183*** (0.00247)					
Highly educated	0.0731*** (0.00501)					
std prediction		-0.000694 (0.000489)	-0.000114 (0.000130)	-0.000345* (0.000158)	0.000216 (0.000253)	-0.00187* (0.000820)
Observations	61152	61152	15334	15257	15260	15300

Notes: Standard errors clustered on municipality level. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Robustness checks

Moving on to the robustness checks, Table A6 replicates the baseline results in Table 1, only we add a control for if an immigrant moved between municipalities during the first year in the country. If an immigrant moved, the place of residence we observe in the data may not be the place the individual was assigned to. However, considering the results in A6, the addition of the moving control do not seem to change the baseline results at all.

Furthermore, Table A7 reports estimates from models replicating the results in Table 1 in the main text but using a different way of dividing the sample into quartiles in columns 2-5. In the main text we used the share of all resident coethnics in 1987-1991 who voted in the local elections in 1982 as our measure of political integration, based on which the sample was divided into quartiles. For the models presented in Table A7 we instead use the share of resident coethnics who voted in 1982 out of those

who were also eligible to vote in 1982 as our measure of political integration. The results obtained from using this specification of political integration are very similar to the estimates displayed in Table 1 in the main text.

In Table A8 we focus on voter turnout in the 1994 local elections (the short-term effects) and make two changes in comparison to the specification used for the models in Table 1 in the main text. First, a potential drawback with the data being used is that immigrants from small source countries have been grouped together with immigrants from neighboring countries for reasons of confidentiality. To examine whether this poses a problem we have re-run the models including only immigrants from countries that we can identify uniquely (see Table A4). The results are presented in Panel A and, if anything, the positive effect of being settled with coethnics on voter turnout in the fourth quartile becomes even more pronounced when restricting the analysis to immigrants from individual source countries. At the same time, there is a negative and significant effect among individuals ending up in less integrated enclaves (quartile 1).

Second, we check whether our results are robust to logging the measure of coethnic concentration (Panel B). The pattern of estimates are very similar to the ones displayed in the upper panel of Table 1 in the main text. In Panel C we show results from estimations combining both a logged measure of coethnic concentration and a sample restricted to unique sending countries. Once again we can conclude that our main results seem to be robust to these modelling choices.

In Table A9 we use an alternative turnout outcome to capture potential long-term effects of coethnic concentration in one's arrival parish: voting in the 2009 European Parliament (EP) election. The results for turnout in the 2009 EP election are very similar to the ones obtained for turnout in the 2010 local elections displayed in the lower panel of Table 1 in the main text. Thus, our conclusion that coethnic exposure, given that the coethnics are politically integrated, has a positive short-term impact but no detectable long-term effects holds also for this alternative outcome measure.

Finally, it is possible that the observed difference between short and long run estimates follows from selective out-migration over time, and that the samples used in our short and long run analyses are different. To address this concern we re-run the short term estimations using the baseline model (Table 1, Panel A) but excluding the individuals who are no longer in the sample in 2010. If the difference between short and long run estimates are simply due to different samples, we would expect striking changes to our coefficients. Yet, in Table A10, we can observe that the short term average effect, as expected, remains close to zero and insignificant. Considering the fourth quartile of political participation

among coethnics (column 5), the coefficient is still positive and significant. While the point estimate is slightly smaller compared to what was found in the baseline model (Table 1, Panel A, column 5), the coefficients are not significantly different from one another (5% significance level).

Table A6: Effect of coethnics in arrival parish 1987-1991 on voting in the municipal elections in 1994 and 2010, adding a control for moving in arrival year.

	Full sample (1)	Quartiles (based on pol. integrated coethnics)			
		Q1 (2)	Q2 (3)	Q3 (4)	Q4 (5)
PANEL A (Short run, 1994 elections)					
Coethnics/ parish inhabitants	0.00836 (0.00685)	0.0107 (0.0116)	-0.0202 (0.0118)	-0.00194 (0.0140)	0.0225*** (0.00494)
Observations	61152	15334	15257	15260	15300
PANEL B (Long run, 2010 elections)					
Coethnics/ parish inhabitants	-0.00181 (0.00358)	0.00841 (0.0106)	0.0117 (0.0146)	0.00645 (0.0119)	-0.00141 (0.00463)
Observations	49991	13217	12829	12386	11559
Country by cohort FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Parish FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Individual covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Standard errors clustered on municipality level. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Controls similar as in Table 1, adding dummies for if the individual moved out of a municipality during the first year.

Table A7: Effect of coethnics in arrival parish 1987-1991 on voting in the municipal elections in 1994 and 2010, alternative definition of integrated quartiles

	Full sample (1)	Quartiles (based on pol. integrated coethnics)			
		Q1 (2)	Q2 (3)	Q3 (4)	Q4 (5)
PANEL A (Short run)					
Coethnics/ parish inhabitants	0.00766 (0.00689)	0.00762 (0.0119)	-0.0139 (0.0144)	0.00766 (0.00960)	0.0278* (0.0109)
Observations	61152	15341	15285	15239	15286
PANEL B (Long run, 2010 election)					
Coethnics/ parish inhabitants	-0.00210 (0.00359)	0.00970 (0.0101)	0.0120 (0.0138)	-0.0109* (0.00534)	0.000257 (0.0155)
Observations	49991	13197	12562	11735	12496

Notes: Standard errors clustered on municipality level. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. For exact controls see Table 1.

Table A8: Effect of coethnics in arrival parish 1987-1991 on voting in the municipal elections in 1994, using single country codes och log of the explanatory variable

	Full sample (1)	Quartiles (based on pol. integrated coethnics)			
		Q1 (2)	Q2 (3)	Q3 (4)	Q4 (5)
PANEL A					
(Single country)					
Coethnics/ parish inhabitants	0.0111 (0.0103)	-0.0370 (0.0230)	-0.0232 (0.0188)	-0.0252 (0.0276)	0.0379*** (0.00893)
Observations	26818	8299	8930	4647	4941
PANEL B					
(Logs)					
log(Coethnics)	0.00580 (0.00404)	0.00553 (0.00695)	-0.00431 (0.00770)	0.0104 (0.00976)	0.0255** (0.00879)
Observations	60734	15334	15257	15260	14882
PANEL C					
(Logs and single countries)					
log(Coethnics)	0.00185 (0.00676)	-0.0162 (0.0107)	-0.00195 (0.0119)	-0.00382 (0.0181)	0.0489* (0.0196)
Observations	26655	8299	8930	4647	4778

Notes: Standard errors clustered on municipality level. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. For exact controls see Table 1.

Table A9: Effect of coethnics in arrival parish 1987-1991 on voting in the European Parliament elections in 2009.

	Full sample (1)	Quartiles (based on pol. integrated coethnics)			
		Q1 (2)	Q2 (3)	Q3 (4)	Q4 (5)
Coethnics/ parish inhabitants	-0.00411 (0.00612)	-0.00538 (0.0113)	0.00378 (0.0120)	-0.00714 (0.0156)	-0.00438 (0.00610)
Observations	45442	12279	11989	11094	10080

Notes: Standard errors clustered on municipality level. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. For exact controls see Table 1.

Table A10: Effect of coethnics in arrival parish 1987-1991 on voting in the local election in 1994, using only the long-run sample.

	Full sample (1)	Quartiles (based on pol. integrated coethnics)			
		Q1 (2)	Q2 (3)	Q3 (4)	Q4 (5)
Coethnics/ parish inhabitants	0.00294 (0.00780)	0.0117 (0.0121)	-0.0158 (0.0133)	-0.0130 (0.0169)	0.0162* (0.00764)
Observations	49991	13217	12829	12386	11559
Country by cohort FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Parish FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Individual covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Standard errors clustered on municipality level. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. For exact controls see Table 1. Sample restricted to immigrants who remain in Sweden, as well as in the electoral rolls, in 2010.

Additional analyses

In addition to the robustness checks we perform three additional analyses below. First, our main results are based on stratifying the sample across level of political integration among coethnics. Of course, this is but one way of categorizing the resources within an ethnic enclave. Coethnics who vote might, for example, also be highly educated or work in a high status occupation. To address the influence of other resources within the ethnic enclaves, we re-estimated the baseline regression (Equation 1), but added a number of different “quality measures” of the ethnic enclave. Our main goal with this exercise is to test whether there is an effect of politically integrated coethnics, *even when we condition on other ethnic resources*. The simplest way to do this is arguably to linearly regress the individual decision to vote on the share of voting coethnics, whilst keeping other measures of enclave resources, such as education or income, constant. Results using this procedure are seen in Table A11.

In the first column of Table A11, we apply Equation 1, but add the share of voting coethnics in the parish as an additional variable. The variables are standardized, therefore, according to the results, a standard deviation increase in the share of voting coethnics (given the overall share of coethnics in the parish) increases the probability of voting with 2.8 percentage points. This result is expected and numerically very close to what we observe in the last column of the baseline results (Table 1, where we estimate the effect of an increase in the share of coethnics, conditional on the parish coethnics being relatively politically integrated. In the second column we then add the share of highly educated coethnics, which seem to provide no separate effect on voting. Last, in column (3), we add the mean (total) income among parish coethnics, as well as a measure for occupational status among the employed coethnics.¹⁵ The effect of voting coethnics stays remarkably stable, with no additional effect coming from coethnics

¹⁵We use Treiman’s international prestige scale to measure occupational status.

with other resources, be it education, income or occupational status. In other words, conditional on the share of coethnics in the parish, as well as the average income, education and occupational status among parish coethnics, an immigrant who were placed with more politically integrated coethnics also voted more in the local elections of 1994. The results hence seem to provide suggestive evidence that it is specifically *politically* integrated coethnics that matters, rather than integrated coethnics per se.

Second, we also perform two heterogeneity estimations by splitting the sample along two interesting characteristics: men vs women, and level of radical right support in the assigned to municipality in 1991. Starting with stratification across sex, as is demonstrated in Table A12, the point estimates follow the same pattern for men and women. Effects are small and insignificant up until the fourth quartile of political integration, when the point estimate for males become larger than what we observe for women. While the effects are slightly different, we do not wish to stress the difference between the estimates for men and women: The pattern with increasing effects in the fourth quartile is similar for the two groups. Moreover, the point estimates for men and women in the fourth quartile are not statistically significantly different from one another.

Last, Table A13 splits the sample across support for the radical right. More specifically, we use voting in the national elections in 1991, which was the most recent election prior to 1994. We then take out the municipality share who voted for "Ny Demokrati" (ND), which was a new and short-lived party in Sweden, who gained a lot of support in the early 90's. The platform of the party combined anti-establishment and anti-immigration policies, and have therefore been labeled as an early representative of the radical right in Sweden. The split sample estimation divides all immigrants in two groups, one assigned to a municipality with more than median level voting for ND in the elections in 1991, and one group assigned to below median level voting for ND. Having done so, Table A13 again gives us a significant positive effect in the fourth quartile, which is very similar for the two groups studied.

Table A11: Regressing voting in the local election in 1994 on different definitions of the ethnic enclave

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Coethnics/ parish inhabitants	-0.0147* (0.00624)	-0.0159* (0.00624)	-0.0238*** (0.00566)
coethnics voting in 1982 election/parish inhabitants	0.0281*** (0.00435)	0.0286*** (0.00437)	0.0330*** (0.00387)
share of high edu. among parish coethnics		-0.00629 (0.00410)	-0.00259 (0.00503)
mean occupational status among parish coethnics			0.00234 (0.00386)
mean total income among parish coethnics			0.000806 (0.00517)
Observations	61152	60734	47431
Country by cohort FE	YES	YES	YES
Parish FE	YES	YES	YES
Individual covariates	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Standard errors clustered on municipality level. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A12: Effect of coethnics in arrival parish 1987-1991 on voting in local elections in 1994, split sample by men and women

	Full sample (1)	Quartiles (based on pol. integrated coethnics)			
		Q1 (2)	Q2 (3)	Q3 (4)	Q4 (5)
PANEL A (Men)					
Coethnics/ parish inhabitants	0.00897 (0.00690)	0.00985 (0.0132)	-0.0151 (0.0143)	-0.0123 (0.0195)	0.0278*** (0.00428)
Observations	35442	9571	9002	8408	8461
PANEL B (Women)					
Coethnics/ parish inhabitants	0.00667 (0.00795)	0.0189 (0.0196)	-0.0264 (0.0195)	0.00717 (0.0175)	0.0157 (0.0126)
Observations	25710	5763	6255	6852	6839
Country by cohort FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Parish FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Individual covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Standard errors clustered on municipality level. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. For exact controls see Table 1.

Table A13: Effect of coethnics in arrival parish 1987-1991 on voting in local elections in 1994. Split sample by municipality level of support for radical right in 1991.

	Full sample (1)	Quartiles (based on pol. integrated coethnics)			
		Q1 (2)	Q2 (3)	Q3 (4)	Q4 (5)
PANEL A (Large 1991 ND vote)					
Coethnics/ parish inhabitants	-0.00182 (0.00711)	0.00433 (0.0124)	-0.0354** (0.0125)	0.0120 (0.0156)	0.0189** (0.00717)
Observations	30489	6360	7581	7948	8600
PANEL B (Small 1991 ND vote)					
Coethnics/ parish inhabitants	0.0138* (0.00594)	0.0148 (0.0222)	0.00261 (0.0241)	-0.0465*** (0.0106)	0.0249*** (0.00584)
Observations	30662	8974	7676	7311	6700
Country by cohort FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Parish FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Individual covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Standard errors clustered on municipality level. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. For exact controls see Table 1.

References Appendix

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